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This paper studies redistribution by means of a public supply of
medical treatment. We show that the government can redistribute in-
come towards low-ability individuals in a world of asymmetric informa-
tion by oﬀering bundles of medical treatment and redistributive pay-
ment. If self-selection is a problem, then the separating scheme oﬀers
high-ability individuals complete treatment against a high payment,
and low-ability individuals partial treatment against a low payment.
In particular, the level of treatment oﬀered low-ability individuals is
distorted downwards.
Keywords: health, medical treatment, insurance, redistribution,
self-selection
JEL Code: I18, H42, D81
1 Introduction
Medical treatment is but one example of a private good which in a number
of countries is publicly supplied. Redistribution, along with paternalism,
has been, and probably still is, a major reason why this is so. Public sup-
ply of treatment is usually ﬁnanced by individuals contributing according
to their (gross) income, either through general taxation or through ear-
marked contributions. The supply of treatment, on the other hand, is often
provided according to individuals’ need for treatment, rather than their con-
tributions. Traditionally, this way of organising the ﬁnancing and supply of
medical treatment is thought to facilitate some kind of income redistrib-
ution towards low-income individuals. Underlying this way of reasoning is
1the assumption that individuals with identical medical needs prefer identical
levels of medical treatment. We will, however, show that individuals with
identical medical need for treatment may indeed prefer diﬀerent levels of
treatment and, consequently, diﬀerent levels of recovery. In particular, indi-
viduals’ preferred level of treatment is shown to be higher the higher their
level of innate ability. This suggests that those contributing the most to the
public health sector (i.e. high-income individuals) are also those utilising
the services provided the most. The extent of redistribution may, therefore,
not be as large as one would think.
The purpose of this paper is to identify Pareto-eﬃcient bundles of med-
ical treatment and payment that facilitate income redistribution towards
low-ability individuals when information about individuals’ level of ability
(income) is private to the individuals. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that this is the government’s only means of redistribution, moreover, there is
no private supply of medical treatment. We postulate that the government
does not pursue a particular distribution of medical treatment (health) per
se.1
There exists a fairly extensive literature on public provision of private
goods as a means of redistribution in a second best world, some of which are:
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Ireland (1990), Besley and Coate (1991),
Epple and Romano (1996), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1998), and
Boadway, Marchand and Sato (1998).2 The present paper is most closely
related to that of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988, hereafter B-D) in that we
use bundles of transfers and medical treatment as a means of redistribution.
Whereas B-D study redistribution between ill and healthy individuals, i.e.
redistribution ex post, we study redistribution between income groups ex
ante, i.e. prior to knowing whether individuals are ill or not. Consequently,
B-D study adverse selection problem in health types (i.e. whether ill or not),
whereas we study adverse selection problem in ability types (i.e. whether
high or low ability). B-D show that in a second-best world, publicly provided
medical treatment to the ill is ‘overprovided’ in the sense that their marginal
willingness to pay for treatment is less than marginal cost of treatment.
Here, we will show that subsidised treatment to the ill is ‘underprovided’, i.e.
1One may argue that health is a particular commodity for which the society has dis-
tinct egalitarian ambitions, i.e. that health is subject to what Tobin (1970) calls speciﬁc
egalitarianism. The society may, for instance, aspire to achieve equality in health (e.g.
as measured as quality adjusted life years over individuals’ lifetime), or somewhat less
ambitious: to reduce inequalities in health.
2Balestrino (1999) provides a survey of the literature on in-kind transfers in the presence
of distortionary taxes.
2their marginal willingness to pay is higher than marginal cost of treatment,
if their level of innate ability is low. Our ﬁndings thus run counter to those
of B-D, due to diﬀerent informational assumptions.
The substance of our model is outlined as follows. Individuals may fall
ill thus suﬀering a loss both in utility directly, and in ability to earn in-
come. They can, however, buy medical treatment that restores health, and
thus also ability, with certainty. Medical treatment at a given level is as-
sumed to restore ability in the same proportion for all individuals. Beneﬁts
from treatment, and subsequently willingness to pay for treatment, is conse-
quently higher the higher the level of innate ability. Since medical treatment
is more valuable to high-ability individuals than to low-ability individuals,
the government can separate the two types of individuals by oﬀering two
bundles, each specifying level of treatment and level of payment: one con-
taining complete treatment and a high payment; type (i), and one containing
partial treatment and a low payment; type (ii). If redistribution leads to a
binding self-selection constraint, bundle (i) will not be distortionary, while
bundle (ii) will be. In particular, the level of treatment provided in bundle
(ii) will be distorted downwards, as this will be more costly to high-ability
individuals than to low-ability individuals. The subsidised medical treat-
ment allows low-ability individuals to have a higher level of consumption in
the two possible states of the world (healthy or ill), and are, consequently,
better oﬀ relatively to a situation without redistribution.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we derive the model and
undertake a preliminary analysis, and in Section 3 we derive the govern-
ment’s Pareto-eﬃcient menu of contracts facilitating redistribution towards
low-ability individuals. Finally, we discuss our ﬁndings in Section 4.
2 Preliminary analysis: Allocation of income across
states of the world.3
In the subsequent analysis, we describe a representative individual’s ex ante
optimisation problem. The individual has preferences over consumption (c)
a n dh e a l t h( h): u(c,h). There are two possible states of health: she may
with probability (1 − π) be in good health: state 1, or with probability π
(0 < π ≤ 0,5) be ill: state 2.4 The two states are jointly exhaustive and
3T h ea n a l y s i si nt h i ss e c t i o ni sb a s e do nas o m e w h a tm o d i ﬁed version of a model
d e v e l o p e di nA s h e i m ,E m b l e ma n dN i l s s e n( 2 0 0 0 ) .
4We assume that the individual can neither inﬂuence the probability of falling ill, nor
the costs associated with the illness, i.e. no moral hazard.
3veriﬁable. Information on risk is symmetrically distributed. Health in state
1 is normalised to 1: h1 =1 , while health in state 2 is assumed to be zero:
h2 =0 . Health if ill can (with certainty) be partly or fully restored if medical
treatment t (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) is utilised. Treatment leading to complete recovery,
i.e. t =1 ,h a sac o s to fp r o d u c t i o ne q u a lt oC, while treatment leading to
partial recovery has a cost tC. Health if ill is henceforth represented by t:
h2 = t. Consumption in state 1 and 2 is denoted c1 and c2, respectively.
The individual is an expected utility maximiser. Hence, her preferences
are represented by the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
(1 − π)u(c1,1) + πu(c2,t). (1)
We assume that u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Also, uch ≥ 0, where the partial derivative is denoted by
subscript. Health is thus not only an important factor of well-being in its
o w nr i g h t ,b u tm a ya l s oa ﬀect the individual’s ability to enjoy consumption.
It follows that c and h are normal goods. Furthermore, uc(c,h) →∞as
c ↓ 0 whenever h>0 and uh(c,h) →∞as h ↓ 0 whenever c>0.M o r e o v e r ,
uc(c,h) →∞or uh(c,h) →∞as c ↓ 0 and h ↓ 0. Hence, she strictly desires
a positive level of consumption and health.
The individual’s level of innate ability (productivity) is given by A. In-
formation about innate ability is private to the individual. If in good health,
her level of ability is equal to A, while if ill, her level of ability is equal to
tA. Earnings are assumed to be proportional to ability.
By the properties of u (strict concavity) it follows that the individual is
risk averse. There exists a perfectly competitive private insurance market
oﬀering cash compensation if illness occurs. The compensation can be used
to cover medical expenditures and partly compensate for (permanent) loss
in income due to reduced ability, e.g. in the form of a disability payment.
Insurance is oﬀered at an actuarially fair premium πI,s ot h a tπI must be
paid in both states in order to have coverage equal to I if ill. To insure is the
only way the individual can transfer income across the two possible states
of the world. Let P represent payment for treatment. Then her budget
constraint in state 1 and 2 is: c1+ πI = A and c2 + πI + P = tA + I,
respectively. Her ex ante choice of c1 and c2 when the budget constraint is
binding in both states of the world, is thus constrained by:
(1 − (1 − t)π)A =( 1− π)c1 + π(c2 + P). (2)
The individual’s expected utility maximising choice of consumption in
the two states of the world is derived by maximising eq.(1) subject to eq.(2).
4The Lagrangian is given by:
L(c1,c 2,λ;t,P,A)=( 1 − π)u(c1,1) + πu(c2,t)
+λ[(1 − (1 − t)π)A − (1 − π)c1 − π(c2 + P)].
It follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions that:
uc(c1(t,P,A),1) = uc(c2(t,P,A),t)=λ, (3)
that is; marginal utility of consumption is equal across states. The consump-
tion demand function in each state is given by: c1(t,P,A) and c2(t,P,A).
The private insurance market consequently allows her to attain her optimal
distribution of consumption across states. In the subsequent analysis, we
will therefore concentrate on characterising her preferences if ill; in particu-
lar, her marginal willingness to pay for medical treatment at the expense of
consumption if ill.
The individual’s indirect utility function is given by:
V (t,P,A)=( 1− π)u(c1(t,P,A),1) + πu(c2(t,P,A),t). (4)
V is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in P, and strictly increasing in
A. We can therefore deﬁne a curve, call it P(t,A;t,P), going through (t,P)
in (t,P)-space and showing combinations of t and P yielding a constant level
of utility. Accordingly, the utility, V (t,P,A), of an individual with ability
A facing (t,P) is equal to V (t,P,A) if and only if P = P(t,A;t,P).T h e




















where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem, and the fourth
equality is implied by the ﬁrst-order condition in eq.(3). This means that
the marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals the sum of consumption
and production value5 of health.
The indiﬀerence curve P(t,A;¯ t,P) can be shown to be a strictly concave
function of t. If follows that the marginal willingness to pay for treatment
5As measured by the additional earnings capacity generated by treatment.
5is positive and decreasing in t. Moreover, since ucc < 0, uch ≥ 0 and












i.e. marginal willingness to pay for treatment is increasing in her level of
innate ability. Graphically, this implies that the slope of an indiﬀerence
curve through any point (¯ t,P) is increasing in A.I n d i ﬀerence curves are
consequently steeper the higher the level of innate ability and they cross
only once, i.e. single-crossing.6 The single-crossing property is illustrated
in Figure 1 for two diﬀerent values of ability: AL <A H, where L and H
denotes low and high ability, respectively.
Holding t and A constant, then a higher payment for treatment implies
that she will have to reduce her level of consumption in state 2. Marginal












hence, the income eﬀect of a higher P is negative, as would be expected. It
follows that the slope of the indiﬀerence curve through any point (t,P) is
decreasing in payment.
The following result is useful for the main analysis. It shows that if innate
ability is suﬃciently high, then marginal willingness to pay for treatment
exceeds cost of treatment, independently of payment. Moreover, if innate
ability is suﬃciently low, and payment equals cost of treatment, then mar-
ginal willingness to pay for treatment equals marginal cost only if treatment
is partial.
Lemma If A ≥ C,t h e n∂P(t,A;t,P)/∂t>Cfor all t and P.I f
A ≤ πC,t h e n∂P(t,A;t,tC)/∂t = Conly if 0 <t<1.
Proof. Recalling that C is the production cost of complete treatment, then
if A ≥ C, it follows from eq.(5) that the individual’s marginal willingness
to pay for treatment: ∂P(t,A;t,P)/∂t, is greater than C.A s s u m e n o w
that A ≤ πC.I f t =1and P = C, then we see from eq.(2) and (3)
that c1 = c2 = A − πC, implying that t =1is not feasible when A ≤
6The single-crossing property corresponds to the ‘Agent Monotonicity condition’ in
the literature on income taxation (Seade, 1982) and the ‘Spence-Mirrlees condition’ in the
literature on screening (Macho-Stadler & Pérez-Castrillo, 1997).
6πC.M o r e o v e r , i f A ↓ πC and t =1 , then it follows from eq. (2) that:
c2 =( A − πC + c1(π − 1)) 1
π ≤ (A − πC)1
π ↓ 0.B y t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f u7,
∂P(1,A;1,tC)/∂t → πC<Cwhen A ↓ πC. Consequently, if A ≤ πC,t h e n
∂P(t,A;t,tC)/∂t = C only if 0 <t<1.
3 Main analysis: Health vs subsidy
We now expand the analysis to include two types of individuals who are
identical in all respects save their individual level of innate ability: they
may either have a high ability: AH ≥ C, or a low ability: AL ≤ πC.8 The
number of individuals of each type is given by Ni,i= H,L.T h eg o v e r n m e n t
knows the proportion of each type of individuals, but cannot observe their
identity. The individuals’ indirect utility function is given by eq.(4).
The government designs a menu of Pareto-eﬃcient contracts specifying
bundles of payment and treatment: {(tL,P L),(tH,P H)},w h e r e(tL,P L) and
(tH,P H)denotes the contract intended for low- and high-ability individu-
als, respectively. Contracts cannot be traded once they have been signed,
moreover, medical treatment can not be supplemented. Contracts specifying
combinations of treatment and payment are derived by:
max
(tL,PL),(tH,PH)
V (tL,P L,A L)
subject to:
V ≤ V (tH,P H,A H)
V (tH,P H,A L) ≤ V (tL,P L,A L)
V (tL,P L,A H) ≤ V (tH,P H,A H)
NL(PL − tLC)+NH(PH − tHC)=0
0 ≤ ti ≤ 1, i = H,L.
The ﬁrst constraint ensures high ability individuals a certain level of util-
ity. The second and the third constraints are the self-selection constraints.
The fourth constraint is the government’s balanced budget constraint, while
the ﬁfth constraint is the restriction that individuals cannot obtain more
7uc(c,h) →∞as c ↓ 0 whenever h>0.
8By assuming that they face identical risk of falling ill, we disregard questions regarding
the relationship between ability and health (e.g. whether the likelihood of falling ill is
correlated with the individuals’ ability). Obviously, there is a relationship between health
and socio-economic status, a fact that is of importance to the discussion of redistribution,
yet the direction (and the strength) of causation is not straightforward.
7than complete treatment (i.e. t ≤ 1), nor ‘sell’ treatment (i.e. t ≥ 0). As
can be checked, the self-selection constraint and the constraint on the level
of treatment are both satisﬁed for low-ability individuals in the subsequent
analysis. It also holds that the non-negativity constraint on treatment is
satisﬁed for high-ability individuals. Forming the Lagrangian:
L = V (tL,P L,A L)+λ[V (tH,P H,A H) − V ]+µ[V (tH,P H,A H) − V (tL,P L,A H)]
+γ [NL(PL − tLC)+NH(PH − tHC)] + φ(1 − tH).
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For the moment, we assume that the government has no redistribution
ambitions,a n dt h a tp a y m e n tr e ﬂects cost of production. In addition, we
assume that the self-selection constraint on high-ability individuals is not
binding (i.e. µ =0 ). Since, by assumption, the government has only one
means of redistribution, the following provides a benchmark against which
redistribution can be compared. Dividing eq.(8) by eq.(9) and using eq.(5)
we ﬁnd:
∂P(tL,A L;tL,t LC)/∂t = C,
hence, low-ability individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for treatment
equals cost of treatment. Since AL ≤ πC, it follows from Lemma 1 that
0 <t L < 1,t h u s :PL = tLC. Dividing eq.(10) by eq.(11) and using eq.(5)
we get:
∂P(tH,A H;tH,t HC)/∂t = C + φ/γNH.
8The government’s zero-revenue constraint is assumed to hold, thus γ > 0.
The marginal imputed cost incurred in restraining the individuals’ level of
treatment (i.e. tH ≤ 1)i sg i v e nb yφ. From Lemma 1 we know that
φ > 0, and thus tH =1 , implying that the treatment constraint is binding.
Moreover, PH = C.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,V = V (1,C,A H).
The eﬃcient bundles of treatment and payment when there is no redis-
tribution: {(tL,t LC),(1,C)}, are illustrated in Figure 2. As can be seen,
self-selection will not be a problem since high-ability individuals would suf-
fer a loss in utility if choosing low-ability individuals’ bundle (and since
low-ability individuals can not aﬀord high-ability individuals’ bundle).
Redistribution
We now assume that the government has redistribution ambitions,i n
particular, it seeks to maximise the sum of utilities, i.e. a utilitarian welfare
function. This corresponds to λ = NH/NL, entailing that the weight of high-
ability individuals relative to low-ability individuals corresponds solely to the
numbers of individuals in each group. Utilitarianism leads to redistribution
from high- to low-ability individuals if λ >N H/NL in the situation without
redistribution. In the subsequent, we will show that λ is indeed greater than
NH/NL when there is no redistribution.
Since µ =0when the government does not redistribute, it follows from
eq.s (9) and (11)t h a tλ >N H/NL corresponds to: −∂V (tL,t LC,AL)/∂P>
−∂V (1,C,A H)/∂P. Since, by eq.(3), −∂V (t,P,A)/∂P = −∂L/∂P = πuc(c1,1),
it follows, as ucc < 0,t h a tλ in a situation without redistribution exceeds
NH/NL if and only if c1(1,C,A H) >c 1(tL,t LC,AL). To show that this
is the case, note that it follows from the constraint in eq.(2) and the fact
that consumption in state 2 is non-negative, tha˙ t: (1 − (1 − tL)π)A ≥ (1 −
π)c1(tL,t LC,AL)+π(tLC). Hence, since AL ≤ πC, we obtain c1(tL,t LC,AL) ≤
(1 − t)πC. Moreover, it follows from eq.(3) and the constraint in eq.(2)
that high-ability individuals’ level of consumption when tH =1is given by
c1(1,C,A H)=c2(1,C,A H)=AH − πC. Recalling that π ≤ 0.5,w et h u s
see that c1(1,C,A H) >c 1(tL,t LC,AL). The level of consumption in state
1 is, in other words, higher for high-ability individuals than for low-ability
individuals. Consequently, we have established that the government under
utilitarianism wants to redistribute towards low-ability individuals.
Proposition 1 If the government has a utilitarian welfare function, then
income is redistributed from high-ability individuals to low-ability individu-
als.
9However, even if utilitarianism leads to redistribution from high- to
low-ability individuals, we cannot determine without further assumptions
whether redistribution is carried out to the extent that the self-selection
constraint on high-ability individuals is binding. Self-selection may in fact
not be a problem in the utilitarian optimum even if marginal utility of con-
sumption is equalised across individuals and states. This is because the
low-ability individuals’ level of consumption and treatment in state 2 may
be suﬃciently low to prevent high-ability individuals from wanting to mas-
querade. In the following, we will study the situation where the self-selection
constraint binds,i . e . µ>0, using the same approach to the self-selection
problem as suggested by Stiglitz (1987).
The bundle intended for the low-ability individuals is found by dividing













Deﬁning v ≡ µ
∂V (tL,PL,AH)













From Section 2 we know that high-ability individuals’ marginal willingness
to pay for treatment is higher than that of low-ability individuals at any
treatment-payment combination, so also for (tL,P L): ∂P(tL,A H;tL,P L)/∂t>
∂P(tL,A L;tL,P L)/∂t.S i n c ev<09, it follows that C<∂P(tL,A L;tL,P L)/∂t<
∂P(tL,A H;tL,P L)/∂t in the self-selection equilibrium. Low-ability individ-
uals are, in other words, oﬀered a level of treatment tL at which their mar-
ginal willingness to pay exceeds the marginal cost of production. The level
of treatment is consequently distorted downwards. Graphically, the slope of
both high- and low-ability individuals’ indiﬀerence curve through the point
(tL,P L) exceeds the slope of the isocost line.
The bundle intended for high-ability individuals is derived by diving eq.







By assumption, γ > 0. From Lemma 1 it follows that φ > 0 and thus tH =1 .
Hence, the marginal willingness to pay for treatment exceeds the marginal
9Because µ ≥ 0,γ ≥ 0 and ∂VH/∂P<0.
10cost of treatment for the non-distortionary reason that treatment cannot
restore health beyond its original level. Therefore, the contract intended for
the high-ability individuals is not distorted at the margin.10
Proposition 2 If the self-selection constraint binds, then the optimal sep-
arating scheme is such that:
(i) High-ability individuals’ bundle of treatment and payment is not dis-
tortionary.
(ii) Low-ability individuals’ bundle of treatment and payment is distor-
tionary. In particular, the level of medical treatment is distorted down-
wards since this is more costly to high-ability mimickers than to low-
ability individuals.
Consequently, if the self-selection constraint binds, the government in-
duces individuals to reveal information by oﬀering two bundles: {(tL,P L),(1,P H)},
where 0 <t L < 1.11 High-ability individuals are discouraged from mas-
querading as low-ability individuals by restricting the level of treatment
available to low-ability individuals. The attained self-selection equilibrium
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Relating our ﬁndings to those of B-D; we have shown that when informa-
tion on ability is asymmetric (and self-selection is a problem), then treatment
is ‘underprovided’ to ill low-ability individuals, whereas B-D show that when
information on health status (ill/healthy) is asymmetric, then treatment is
‘overprovided’ to ill individuals.
Extent of insurance coverage
We apply the following terminology: by full insurance, we mean that
u(c1,h 1)=u(c2,h 2),i . e . that utility is constant across the two states, and
by partial insurance, we mean that u(c1,h 1) >u (c2,h 2), i.e. that utility is
lower if ill than if healthy.
High-ability individuals are deﬁned by AH ≥ C.F r o m L e m m a 1 we
know that tH =1 , hence, high-ability individuals’ level of ability will be
equal across states: h1 = h2 =1 . Moreover, their level of consumption in the
10This is analogous to the optimal taxation problem where the marginal tax rate faced by
high-ability individuals is zero, while the marginal tax rate faced by low-ability individuals
is positive (Stiglitz, 1987). This is often called a ‘non-distortion at the top’ property, where
‘top’ refers to individuals that no one would choose to masquerade as.
11Payment may in fact be negative if the subsidy is large, that is; individuals may not
only receive medical treatment, but also a cash transfer from the hospital if ill (the cash
transfer then being contingent on the individual undergoing treatment).
11two states of the world will be identical: c1(1,P H,A H)=c2(1,P H,A H)=
AH − πPH. It follows that u(c1,h 1)=u(c2,h 2) and, consequently, they are
fully insured.
Low-ability individuals are deﬁned by AL ≤ πC. From the above analysis
we know that 0 <t L < 1,h e n c e ,h1 =1and h2 = tL < 1.I t f o l l o w s
from eq. (3) and the properties of u that c1(tL,P L,A L) ≥ c2(tL,P L,A L).
Consequently, u(c1,h 1) >u (c2,h 2) and the individuals are partly insured.
When the government redistributes and self-selection is a problem, then low-
ability individuals’ level of medical treatment is distorted downwards. Their
level of insurance coverage is hence reduced relatively to a situation without
redistribution. They will, however, receive a subsidy which enables them
to have a level of consumption in excess of their earnings minus the cost of
treatment, and which makes them better oﬀ.
4 Discussion
So far, we have studied the individuals’ ex ante decision regarding their
optimal level of consumption in the two states of the world, as well as their
optimal level of medical treatment given the two bundles. If individuals
are rational and have perfect foresight, then their ex post preferred level of
medical treatment will also be preferred ex ante. Prior to knowing which
state of the world has occurred, they are therefore willing to sign a contract
with the public supplier, i.e. hospital, specifying both payment and level
of treatment that is to be made available if ill. Indeed, one would expect
that the individuals would prefer to do so as this would prevent them from
potential transaction costs associated with having to ‘shop around’ for the
appropriate contract when ill. Such a scheme would in fact also be more
in accordance with what may be observed empirically: Public supply of
medical treatment ﬁnanced by individuals contributing through (earmarked)
contributions and supplied free at the point of delivery. The public supply
of treatment may thus be thought of as an insurance where individuals are
compensated in the form of medical treatment directly if illness occurs, i.e.
indemnity in kind. The preceding analysis will still be valid in such a setting,
the only diﬀerence is that individuals ex ante determine their optimal level
of private and public insurance coverage.12
12Such a setting would be more in line with the analysis in Asheim et al., (2000) where
individuals’ demand for insurance against medical expenditures (i.e. in kind) and/or loss
in income due to disability (i.e. in cash) are integrated. Their analysis takes place in a
perfectly competitive private market with no public interference.
12The preceding analysis is based on a highly stylised model. We assume
that individuals with certainty can recover completely by consuming the
appropriate level of medical treatment. Moreover, illness is presumed to
be observable, hence, the private insurers do not face problems of adverse
selection. We have also ignored diﬀerences in the risk of falling ill which
indeed is an important reason for having a (mandatory) public health insur-
ance (Breyer and Hauﬂer, 2000). Possible commitment problems associated
with a re-optimising government aspiring to increase treatment above the
‘announced’ level, is not discussed. The perhaps most striking assumption
underlying this analysis is, however, the assumption that the government
cannot implement income taxation. Consequently, we cannot infer whether
redistribution through public pricing of contracts is more eﬃcient than other
means of redistribution. Extension of the analysis to include also individu-
als’ labour supply and distortionary income taxation, will be the subject of
future research. We think still that our analysis provides interesting results,
results that run counter to what often seems to be implicitly underlying
many studies of public provision of health care; namely that individuals
w i s ht of u l l yr e c o v e rf r o ma ni l l n e s s .
Lastly, our analysis follows the tradition of neo-classical economics in
that individuals’ utility (or preferences) provide the foundation of the analy-
sis. We study distribution of welfare, that is; well-being assessed in utility
terms, thus, we assume that the value of medical treatment to an individual
is represented by her willingness to pay for it.13 An alternative approach
would be the extra-welfarist framework in which health, and not utility, is
the primary outcome of interest (Hurley, 1998). According to this approach,
distributional equity (in the egalitarian concept) implies that medical treat-
ment should be provided according to need, and not according to ability or
willingness to pay.
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Figure 1. The single-crossing property.
Figure 2. Efficient bundles of treatment and payment when there is no redistribution.
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Figure 3. Efficient bundles of treatment and payment when self-selection is a problem.
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